Washington’s Demands Fuel India’s Turn to Rivals

Washington’s Demands Fuel India’s Turn to Rivals
  • calendar_today August 12, 2025
  • Business

.

Washington and New Delhi were said to have enjoyed one of the most successful strategic partnerships in the post–Cold War era for more than two decades. But that partnership, which developed through years of defense and diplomatic cooperation, is now being put to its most severe test yet as oil, tariffs, and realignments have eroded trust.

Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia expert and vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was blunt. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years, that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term, have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone,” he said.

President Donald Trump’s decision to slap wide-ranging tariffs on Indian imports earlier this year over New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil, despite the war in Ukraine, was a breaking point. The tariff, which began at 25 percent and was set to double to 50 percent on August 27, was widely expected to pressure India into diversifying its buying habits. But analysts say it has instead driven New Delhi closer to Moscow and even Beijing.

In recent weeks, India’s national security adviser visited Moscow. Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held high-level talks with Russian officials there. And Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has just finished rounds of discussions in New Delhi. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is preparing for a trip to China, the first in more than seven years. Russian President Vladimir Putin has also said he expects to see Modi in Moscow before the end of the year. Analysts say the shift toward the east isn’t just posturing.

Indian public opinion has hardened as well, with Modi’s government feeling pressure from constituents against what they see as U.S. meddling in internal matters. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

After some initial reticence early in the war, state-run refiners returned to importing Russian oil after being wooed by discounts of between six and seven percent. The purchases have surged: Russia is now providing 35 percent of India’s crude imports, up from just 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. In return, Moscow is expanding its offers. Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said Moscow would “continue to supply crude, oil products, thermal and coking coal to India,” while also seeing “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

Shifts in Political Winds

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Wilson Center, said Trump’s tariffs on India were only part of the reason India’s foreign policy has moved. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons,” he said. “But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly.”

Some of India’s moves may be for show, but Kugelman said others are likely more substantive and long-lasting. Feigenbaum concurred, saying that “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India was already moving away from Russian weapons before the Ukraine war, shifting to U.S., French, and Israeli systems. But after Moscow invaded, trade in energy with India grew. Kugelman said the response “validates Indian beliefs that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Domestically, Modi has an opportunity to burnish his reputation as a bulwark against outside interference in India’s domestic affairs. He has been keen to point out that his first responsibility is to safeguard the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers, all constituencies that are key to his domestic political standing. Kugelman said India had already made many concessions to Washington earlier in the war. India had already made a lot of concessions to the U.S., especially when it came to the war in Ukraine. They conceded on tariffs, repatriating their workers. Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend,” he said. “This is one reason there was no trade deal. Modi put his foot down.”

In Washington, voices have been raised, not least by one of Trump’s former top economic advisers. Writing in the Financial Times, Peter Navarro said the Indian oil purchases were “opportunistic and, frankly, deeply corrosive to U.S.-India relations.” Tariffs would help hit India “where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

Bygone Days of Diplomacy

The setbacks this week stand in stark contrast to some of the previous high points of U.S.-India diplomacy over the past two decades, such as the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal struck in 2008. The agreement gave India access to American fuel and nuclear technology, despite the Asian nation being a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the time, analysts said, New Delhi and Washington had been able to compartmentalize disagreements that arose between the two.